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Tape I, p4 
~\lS Pt!~ corr~ c)-t ol ~ ntvf 't-n:>- -,,~r,f 
t.~q ,<o\ ,-,.A y ~~ CJI~ r ... rr~e,,htM.$ 
TR - What day was July 18, we ✓had our informal conversation? 
n5 - That was a Thursday, because the Doar articles came out on the 19th, 
a Friday. 
CB - That makes better sense. The 24th is the following Wednesday, when 
the TV debates started. 
DS - And the coalition, as such, met for the first time on Tuesday the 23rd. 
WF - I think that Monday night when you [ JMJ and I and Ray were together 
after the Democratic caucus meeting earlier, we talked for a couple of 
hours over in your office-which was really the frist time that the 
three of us had ever talked together formally. We all had talked 
round about it. I had leaned over to ;you [RT] and Jim and I would 
walk back and forth together, but I think at that point the three of 
us were amazed how close together our thinking was on the whole thing. 
We excluded the same things and we included the same thil"'.gs. 
TR - When was that now? 
WF - Monday aj.ght before our Tuesday morning meeting in 1our office. 
TR - Do you remember when you came over to me-I think it was on a Monday 
after our business--and you said, "Rails, why don't 1ou get some guys 
together?" Or something like that •••• 
WF - It was inevitable that we have a meeting soon because we didn't have 
any tapes to sit on. 
LAUGHI'ER 
HF - That. was the first time, Tom, you talked? You were the one who talked 
to them in the committee room? 
U_).1...-.,,. . 
TR - .Iel¥1, we . had been meeting. It was that day that 'ialter came over and 
said, "Why don't you get some guys and I will get some guys and we'll 
meet and talk about it?" 
RT - Walter, just before that meeting, we had our Democratic caucus. I 
know it was amazing how closely we were on track. And at that caucus, 
;you remember there were still some strong discussion by some Democrats 
about Cambodia and about taxes and everything and I read from a draft 
I had before me of the areas of concern that worried me. George 
Danielson asked for a copy of it. He got it and made a Xerox. This 
was the first draft I had worked on sometime over that weekend and maybe 
on Monday morning it was actually being typed up. Now because of the 
dissatisfaction with the Doar work and then as a result of this you [ JMJ 
suggested, I believe, or Walter, we ought to sit down and discuss it. 
And that is as I recall the meeting: not my draft but a discussion of 
the aeeas of concern that we shared. This led to the meeting in your 
office. 
Tape I, p6 
WC - You were having an interview vith Judy Flanders of the Washington Star. -
TR - No, you are talking about a luncheon at the Capitol Hill Club. 
WC - Yeah. 
TR - I u talking about another one. 
WF - You went out to lunch vith all these chicks, didn't you? 
TR - The7 took me. 
LAUGm'ER. 
TR - No, this is another meeting at which you [WC] were not present and I 
think it was kind of a chance meeting. It wasn't planned in any way. 
The three of us got tQ8ether, and this was before I had ~ inkling 
that Caldwell might consider voting for impeachment, and ve just ex-
pressed our concerns. Now there was another meeting over at the Capitol 
Hill Club later. 
HF - Bill Coilen, 7ou, and I were having lunch vith Caldwell and I joined 7ou. 
TR - Yes, and I came in late. Over at the Members' dining room. 
HF - Could 7ou tell us why you and Caldwell were having lunch t~·day? 
LAUGHTER 
HF - What was the genesis of going over there together? 
WC - I rarely" go to the Capitol Hill Club, not being a member of it, so 
I cannot imagine wey I was going with Caldwell. 
CB - That was in rq pa.lm;y days when I could have afforded to be a member. 
WC - I was filling you in on what had happened that morning. And you were 
pretty disturbed about Hutc~on's attitude-that he cannot imagine 
any Republican ever voting for impeachment. 
WF -
-<'"\ '{l..--"' TR -
You know, there is something I don't think I ever know about at all-
that 7ou all had a blowup with Hutchinson. 
~ 
Incidentally", I ~ the dates on that blowup. I ha~ the whole meting 
documented, too. 
WC - What happened is that Hutch~on' s remarks were initially- directed to 
me, and you (TR] were sitting off to the right. "Let's find out, let's 
take a little show of hands to show how many are going to vote for 
impeachment." And then Tom jumped in at that point and said, "Well, 
I don't know how I am-I might_ very well vote for impachment." 
I, p7 
Hutchinson said, "I cannot see how any Republican could even consider 
voting for impeachment. Let's get it out in the open?" And he looked 
around the room. 
I think the exact words were, "How any Republican Congressmen can vote 
to impeach a Republican President?" 
TR - Yes, that's right. 
HF - That agitated me because the assumption was that therefore it would be 
per!ectJ.7 right to vote to impeahh a Democratic Presidnet. 
LAUGHTER 
TR - Exactly! And he said, "Let's get it out into the open •• ••" 
HF - Let it all Qang out. 
TR - Yes, that is waht I was trying to tell him: I might vote to impeach~ 
Republican President. 
HF - You [TR] were the only one who spoke out to answer him. I stayed absolutely 
quiet because •••• 
WC - It got pretty shrill and then Wiggins is the one who broke it up. 
TR- Yfflrll~ · 
RT - Do aey of yuu recall speculation in advance of our group getting together 
that we~were likely to get together and that there might be a bi-partisan 
group emerging? I had it in rq mind there was speculation. 
WF - There was press speculation to that ef feet. 
RT - In advance o! 'ff11' ever hearing about any group meeting, maybe a week in 
advance~ · · 
CB - I have some references here [notes]. Rails and Walter and I talking 
in the comnittee room. Rails walking out with me and said, "You know, 
you and I and Walter got this thing in our hands." That is just about 
the way he put it. And then we started speculating on which way 
everybody was going, and that was just before we met on Tuesday morning. 
WF - I believe it was simply- inevitable that the center coalesced, and we 
were foreed to do it when we did by ti.Jlle. Like e"Terything else here, 
we deal in deadlines. And it ....a gettin' so that there wasn't an_y 
time left. So we backed o!! a deadline and it happened that i.t was 
Tuesdq morning that we got together. 
HF - I don't recall the -speculation that we would get together. .But you 
recall that it was az,ound this time-it must have been on the 16th, 
17th, or 18th-that Timemagazine saw fit to take a photograph on the 
Capitol steps which included Henry Smith •••• _ 
I, p8 
And McClor,-:_.~.five Republicans. 
These seemed to be the undecideds. 
How did they every put Henry into that category? I would never have 
dreamed that he would vote for impeachment. 
TR - Because of Cambodia. He had expressed reservations abet!': that. You 
know, Henry was playing it very close to the vest. I thought he was 
much more likely to be with us than Caldwell. Ju.st for one reason: 
I thought Caldwell had such an impossible politicaJ.: p9~~ion d~ there 
that he justcouldn 't afford under any circumstances~:,, -That"' ray when 
you (00] interviewed me, I told you that I thought it~ was courageous 
of him. 
JM - I feel just like Walter. I said in rq initial interview that I knew 
that were going to meet. It was inevitable. Even though ve hadn·'.t heard it 
discussed, I knew we were going to meet. I guess it was the fact that 
the press was hounding so closely probab ly contributed to our meeting 
. late, because had we gotten together to start talking a little bit 
earlier, we would have been •••• 
TR - Right. 
JM - So, as Walter says, when the time came, and the time had come, or we 
just weeen't going to be able to. 
CB - You know it was j~ gratuitous that Larry Hogan made his statement 
when he did because it was about to blow our cover completely as far 
as the press was concerned. And it was relegated to a pretty small 
report in the paper, as a result of his statement-which I think was 
pretty good, because they could harass the heck out of you. 
JM - Related to the thought you gave about having this thing in our hands. 
I remember Walter and I on numerow, occasions discussing the burden 
that was on us·, knowing that we •• • that it was in our hands. 
WF - I know that Ra,- and Jim had it too-every time we would go over to 
vote or to a cauc•, all the glJ.78 wouJ.d get around us and ~. "What 
is going on there? We are looking to you three to tell .us. We 
don't want to hear these other Democrats, but you three." I think 
we all got our egos built up a lot in this period and it is per!ectly-
natural:. I figured there were at least 40 or 50 southern Democrats, 
that if we three voted tO@ether, would !ollow what we did and be able 
to cover themselves up in what the Southerners on the coDlllittee did. 
JM - We expressed that view during that time when we discussed those numbers. 
HF - I think one or the things that really gave me an extra burden was that 
you knew there were a certain number of people, maybe 10, maybe 15, 
who really could be somewhat i.nnuenced by your decision, and this 
could be critical. 
I, plO 
That morning we didn't make him [Nixon] a part of the break-in or a.:ey-
thing else, but vhat ve did is what we did later: ve shoved that he 
had lied. You kmow that was the case against him, he lied and we had 
the facts to document it. 
WF - You all had a lot more scheduled meetings than we did. I remember one, 
Jim, that just came to rq mind then. Ray, I think you were there, too. 
Southern Democrats were oragnized thru that little research organization. 
Nobody was hardly there but there were 8 or 9 guJ"S that were in a 
boxed up time frame with the Totes going on. We were in some meeting 
room in RA;yburn and they all wanted us to tell them what was going on, 
and we kind of put them on notice that there was a distinct possibility 
that the President of the U.S. was going to be impeached by our vote 
as well as by the Waldies and Drinans-and I think it started them just 
that quiakl.7 to think most seriously then. 
TR - Can I just add one thing that I think is very signi!icant as far as the 
Republicans are concerned? I think it helped us, and certainly gave me 
some support, that I was ... ~~ting with George Bush, the Republican 
National chairman from the very· inception and keeping him informed, and 
I think that helped to moderate his position. And I finally started 
meeting with m::, friend, Bob Michael, who is now the Whip, to tell him 
what I thought and where there vere~lems. I met trice rith John 
Rhodes. ~~e"iii 1 ~,~c~~ 
t..o ••- All of a stldden, he was worrying. 
..Jitj;:~he~uee:=;;e> had a ~aw.om~. 
WC - Tom, I think the aiembers on our side were always fearful that you might 
go for i..mreachment, and what that would mean on the floor. The whole 
st~tegy was to kind of hold you in line, isolate me, and kind of 
discredit me once that was done • 
TR - And Ham too. They were a little worried about him, too. 
WC - That's right. 
HF - But yuu must remember that none of the Members spoke to me about that. 
The closest I got to Rhodes was the series of leadership meetings we had 
starting back in April. 
RT - We sure had no pressure •••• 
TR - There was very little external pressure from any of our colleagues, 
even from the White House. I didn't get an:, from the White House. 
WC - The pressure was different, it was peer pressure, Tom. I disagree .with 
you about the meetings-I dirln 't find them to be very beneficial at all, 
with the leadership sitting around a table and say, "OK, geys, what's 
happening? Then have Hutchinson burp his way thru the meeting-that was 
pretty gross. LAUGHI'ER. And sit around and have Sandman carrying on, 
and then say, "Well, gee, whose left here, no one is speaking up." No 
one whould really raise their voices except one guy, Wiley Mayne, who 
said something in one meeting where Rhodes had said, "Let's not get into 
I, pl3 
There is a great deal of truth in that. 
I think so too. 
WF - And I heard it .from the other side o.f the House. I had serious quest ions 
whether Jerey Waldie and Don ·Edwards aad Bob Drina.n would be there if 
it had been a Democratic President. 
WC - And that is exactly what the tension was on our side o.f the aisle; we 
never got away .from the .feeling that you are really sticking it to us 
because ;you have a Republican President to do it to. 
CB - Do you remember when we had the subpoena? The cle8..Irup amendment I 
had and Lat ta got all over me •••• 
WF - Froelich, who is no longer with us, was really-I don't want to say 
the comed;y o.f the whole thing-but he was the big, enormous, little 
question mark that just jumps in at the last mim:rt,e. I can't figure 
out just how he ended up with us; I don't know. 
TR - I respected what he did, and honestly I think it took a lot o.f guts 
because I 1amw his district well, and I think Froelich was just f1naJJy 
comi.nced as a lawyer-I think he's a pretty good lawyer-that you 
better not rationalize too much. There's another thing: I met with r ..Qeae Heller [?] of Cox newspapers, who brought me a release that i.?r 
dlicated that the 13 minute transcript from the tape on September 15th 
had been obtained, and that transcript was very, Tery condemning as 
far as presidential involvement-direct presidential involvement-was 
concerned. It was the 13 minute segment of the 17 minutes from 6:00 
to 6:17. Somehow the Cox papers had gotten a hold o.f it am it actually ~D,.-.. 
indicaeed that the President had not called George Schulz a "caney ass"~ ·~. :i 
but he had said something to the effect U' "Babr Blue Eyes," meaning · 
George Schulz, thinks he can do that , he is going to have another think=----.. 
coming, and we are going to get rid of him, or something like that.t:"'That 2\ 
really showed . presidnetial complicity in the whole thing. But at that ~ ~ 
point that was not the straw that broke their back; they just kinda -fu u..,.,&wt1--
were again using the rationale, " Veil, that is not really- serious ~ 
evidence"- which it was not, and I agreed, but they just kinda discounted ot rP..5 
that. But the7 did not discount the June 23rd pnsidential statemnt. Je -tr 
That was the straw that f:inaJly did it. T~tiiZttsw>blb.f!\WS ~70., 
~;.:=e:,,i,,~i~ ~ 
WC - The press leaking material to you? 
LAUGHTER 
T}I! - Getting baek to Mr. Flowe~• question about Republicans that would not · , .. 
come along regardless. With regard to the IRS Cox article, you [TR] 
did take two members, I believe, away from the podium into our office. 





This was during TV time? 
Yes, but it vas significant, I thought, that here was a purported 
statementthat corroborated what John Dean had said, and vas even worse 
in a way. 
>- -~vr 
' . .;I-✓,-- .J(- l~ y • 
K}r-'"'- _"---\9 c,.~/2-
,-0r"V'\ -
1. .....--\ • TR -
The grand jury transcript? 







It · also corroborated John Dean's testimocy. 
Be! ore we move on to any discussion of the articles and the outline, 
I would like to pursue one little area-that is that Monday evening 
meeting of 1ourself [ JM], Ray, and Walter. Vas that in arrr way con-
nected with the Democratic leadership? 
I don't remember the precise Democratic caucus, but we kind of laid 
down the law to them, but it might have been the one earlier that evening.' 
It was the one earlier that same evening. 
JM - Yes, it might have been, when we indicated to them that they knew or 
should realize that we held the key to thins thing and we wanted a 
little understanding of that. We didn't express it precisely that way •••• 
WF - It was pretty damn near precisely that way, because that is when the 
others started looking at us out of the corner of their eye. 
JM - It was going to have to be done our way, with a moderate approach to it. · 
I don't know that we named the charges that wewould go along with, but 
we implied that we would not go along with Cambodia and rn. 
WF - Rodino then said, "Well, can you all get together with some of the 
Republicans and see what you can do?" He said that earlier in the evening. 
He was after the fact; we had already decided that we would get together 
the next morning, but then he put, not his stamp of approval on it, but 
his hope that we would. 
HF - Then Theodore White's book is incorrect in saying that Rodino suggested 
to you that you get together as a group? He came in after the fact. 
WF - I never felt that Peter was trying to twist rq arm at all as to scything, 
towards anything. Did any of you all? I think that throughout the 
whole thing, he had a kind of sixth sense about that was reall;y ams.zing. 
I think he knew he had to be patient; he knew that he had to bring it 
along slowly because he knew he had to have us. 
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CB - Just to set this in the time frame, my notes indicate on Monday afternoon 
going back on the trolley rlth Jerry Waldie, he said he vas working on 
a draft of an impachment resolution, he and John Conyers. But I told 
him that was a sample of what we got when the comn.ittee vas about it, 
and that was· as poorly drawn as anything I had ever seen and they agreed. 
[?]. What they vere searching for was the lowest comnon denominator. So 
I talked this OTer and we got sep?ated, the press valked into our inter-
view. Then when I got back to the collllittee room, I vent back over to 
Waldie and told him we weren't going to have that kind of presentation. 
That I vould like to be involved if they were not going to have that 
kind of presentation. I did not want to vote a.gaiMt impeachment becau.5e 
simply it was technieall;r defective. And so after we kicked it around 
for a while, I had determined that Jim Marin and Walter Flowers were 
probably the ones that were working on it, so I went back to Mann and 
told him I would be interested in following that. Then I went to RAilsback 
and ddiscussed that with him further. As a result of that, ...e all agreed 
to get together at a definite time, 8:00 the next 110rning. 
JM - In reference to what yoU5aid a minute ago, Ham, about drafting articles. 
Tom (R J had apparently instructed Tom Mooney two or three days Before 
that also to work on some articles becaU5e he showed up that 110rning 
with a draft, too. 
~-~ 
TR - Jim, I .p an idea to work out of all this. liouldn 't it be a good idea 
to let Mooney, with the benefit of your copious notes and mine, to 
kind of summarize his recollection about the articles and we can interrupt 
him at any point. Why don't you try that, Tom? I want you to set the 
stage, so then we can real..ly fly. 
TM - OK. I personally had no idea that any meetings were going on, frankly. 
I think I remember that on Sunday, before the first meeting in Railsback' s 
office, we first talked about a group. I called Bill Hermelin and asked 
if it wasnt getting down to the short strokes--you know, TV next Wednesday 
and we really don't have IIUCh if we are planning on the Dear articles. 
And I said, "Have you heard Railsback talking about anybody being to-
gether or any group?" He said no, he hadn't, and he said see if there is 
that in the works, because we have to get moving on this thing. Then 
Bill called Railsback in Illinois .taht Sunday afternoon or talked to 
him Monday morning when he got back from Illinois about getting together 
with some people about putting together some viable articles of im-
peachment if that is possible. The next thing I heard was Monday 
afternoon when Railsback came over to me and said, "Listen, we are 
having a meeting at 8:00 in my office." This is Tuesday morning. "Be 
there." That's all he said. 
JM - At what time did he say this? 
Tm - This was about 2 or 3 in the afternoon. 
TR - I think it was later than that. I think it was after Walter came over 
and suggested we do that. 
TM - And we talked togetherin my office: 8:00, be there, that type of thing. 
He didn't say what it was about ar who was going to be there. 
Tape I, p20 
JM - I think y-ou [TR] let of! and said this is the vay I see it or something 
like that. 
RT - Yes, you led oft, I think, by getting into the question or censure. 
TR - Censure, yes. But I said there a.re two areas that bother me-the 
Watergate coverup and the abuse of the sensitive agencies. .lnd we 
went around the r00t1 and we reall.7 had, as you~, a sharing o.f belief's. 
We all seemed to share the same ones. 
WF - It didn't take long. We talked about it gener~ maybe an hour at the 
most. 
TR - Maybe an half hour? 
WF - Mqbe not that long. You were talking about. la.cguage, and when it came 
around to m;r time to say something, I said, "You know, we are talld.ng 
all around the issue: we all are saying we are willing to TOte for 
impeachment.·" 
TR - ~-"Y-/J 
WF - That's when I faced up to itz what the hell .are we doing here? We are 
talking about TOting to impeach the President! 
TR - Right. 
Wli' - And if we were tal.king about voting to impeach the President, in rq 
judgment he was going to be impeached. That was when the hammer hit 
the nail-right there. 
RT - Yes, that's right, Walter. 
TM - Then after the general discussion, ve moved into actuall1 thinking about 
language and drafting. 
TR - -nab. ~ 
TM - And that was when Mr. Mann pulled out his pcieee or paper, and to this 
day I have not seen that, but I recall you had it. 
JM - I might be able to get it• I had Bill Blunt put together all that work 
and it is buried in my boxes of material and I just did not get a chance 
to get itout. 
TM - And he read his, and then Mr. RA.ilsback said, "Now you have something, 
Mooney, read it." And 70u (TR] hadn't seen it before, though, I think. 
TR - I don't think so. 
TM - And I could barely read it, as a matter of .fact. Then we went on to Mr. 
Thornton and he read his. 
. , 
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CB - I rl11 tell you: John Doar wum't doing his job and we didn't realize 
it. Jim Mann was being reassured every day by' John Doar that they 
were backing UB up. I don't eTen think they knew what you me.ant. 
TR - Right. 
WF - I think that those geys had done a massive job of compiling am ac-
cumulating a bunch of crap, and they kept hoping that something was 
going to happen, and it did because we took charge. That is what 
happened. We took charge. And lost the ball game alllost on that 
first day of the argument on specificity. We were in the losing 
bracket then. 
TR - Sure we did. 
WC - Why ve were misled is that h~, after all this compilation ofall 
this information, and then the draft articles, we said, "Look we ought 
to clean up your mess and we will draft it the way the lawyer should 
draft a provable case as far as an indictment is concerned. :;r . 
TR - -~i-
WC - We had assumed that since he had done the draft articles on his own, 
he would at least have the facts to support thea. And that ve would 
just take and put it in the right form, boilit down, . throw out. all 
the excessiYe language and notions, and get it down to the bare mini-
llJUJI. Ve assumed that he had the basic facts in order to prove his own 
case. 
RT - That's right. 
WC - That's why we were misled. 
WF - Doar would have been in a hell of a shape going before a jury with his 
case prepared that way. It wasn't briefed out like arI1' first year law 
school student would take a case to a jury. 
WC - But I think that was the assumption we had: we assumed that since he 
had drafted those articles, he had the back-up material there. We 
were going to clean up the articles so they were short and direct and 
really concise. The facts that he had for his own articles would fit 
the pattern we had established as far as the presentation was concerned. 
TR - To be !'air, ab~ it, al tho I agree with exactly what you said, I think 
that John Doar at that point. was haggard and OTerworked and sleepless. 
But I agree that they were not prepared the way they should have been. 
TM - All that is true, but I think we may be overlooking something here -
his purpose was not to give you a finished product arI1'lfhere. His purpose 
was to throw a lot of stuff on the table and let you shake it1 -down. 
TR - I don't think so. 
I 
-re ~~~ 
Tape II, pl 
A continuation of Tape I: those present, site, and time - same. 
HF - I sat right next to Dennis and Wiggins, and I had never seen two people, 
no matter what ca.me up in that evidentia:rr presentation, vho were less 
moved. 
TR - It seemed that St .Clair by his demeanor kinda acted like Wiggins should 
cave in. [?] 
WF - No, I think those guys and some other politicians had given him too 
much credit. I think we had virtue on our side. We had it. They knew 
it. They were on a losing team, and they !'oum something they could 
grab hold of in St.Clair. 
CB - That's what I thought. 
. WF - They- got him where he [St.Clair] was the only' one out there. 
<'~~ zG onJ en v..,heari W&!?Jd~•. 
HF - St .Clair killed him.self. All that talk about national security •••• 
JM - I'd just sit and fume. 
WC - I was fuming all along. Caldwell and I were tal.lcing 110st o!' the time 
in this entire proceeding, and yet I didn't know what 7ou [CB] were 
going to do. You shocked me one time on Kalmbach •••• I felt sor:rr for 
him. He was a pretty decent fellow, and he was on the roclcs like 
everybody else. I heard your comments, Caldwell, you said, "Bullshit, 
he's stuped, eYen when they tell him what the !'acts are, be would still 
simpl7 go out and do it." Your reaction was that the gtIT is not that 
dumb. 
CB - That's right. 
if'F - You know I still can't beleve that they haven't indicted Bittman. 
TR - I don't get it either. 
CB - and n~Brien, that poor fellow. 
WF - It was the soldier with the commander-in-chief. Pat Gray was a 
political operative to start o:ft with. He wasn't a career civil 
servant; I put them in a little dif"ferent category. In fact, Gray 
was not one of our witneasesand I never did see him in the place, so 
I didn't feel the same way about hi11 as I did about Peterson. 
JM - Maybe not, but he was a career man, wasn't he? 





How did Donahue come to introduce it then? 
All right, Tom can reconstruct that as well as I can. The best available 
drafts we had at the time of the Dona.hue ·introduction, which vas even 
before we started the general session, came from us. 
WF - Dona.hue offered it to precipitate the general discussion. It vas 
primarily our (coalition's] work. 
JM - That vas the best draft we had up to that point. 
TM - The one he actually introduced was 7, 8 •••• It vas taken from our draft 6. 
And this was another constant problem. There was a discussion earlier, 
"Can ve give these articles to Rodino?" You (TR] would say, "Listen, 
I am under some pressure. Rodino wants these articles, because he has 
to have something to lay on the table." 
JM - That' s right. 
TM - And Mr. Flowers would say, "Well, wait a minute." There vas considerable 
discu.!sion of that these eari,- meetings, on a Wednesday afternoon. 
WC - Of course we weren't sure or Rodina's use of Bob McClory. 
TR - Ye.nnuM~~1- But what were the mechanics of getting our 
draft to Donahue for introduction? Did it go to Doar or did it go 
to Rodino or who? 
JM - It vent to Dear. 
WF - Donahue didn't even know where it was. Hell, he was just a warm body 
- and he wasn't even very warm. He just happened to be sitting next 
to the chairman; that was the only thing he ever did. 
LAUGh'TER. 
JM - We had our draft number 6, the best possible vers!i.on of article two 
[sic?] to that point. And those were made available to John Doar to 
the collllittee, which was prepared for Donahue's introduction. I 
don't recall that there was ever any reluctance about making those 
drafts available to Rodino. 
TR - No, I don't think so, not at that point. 
JM - The idea was as a matter of fact quite the contrary. We did as close 
as we could to what we were going to propse on the table to begin with. 
That was the motivation I had - to get those drafts to the committee 
for that purpose. And so they- . were laid on the table as the Donahue 
resolution. 
TR - Did the Democrats caucus about that particular article, in other words 
did they have a meeting to see if they could all supprt it? 
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WF - Rails, you impressed me ..-ery much Wednesday night, your rat-a-tat-tat, 
and I know for a fact that yours wasn't prepared about an hour earlier 
than that. You didn't have any idea what you vere going to say. I 
think you just regurgitated, that is exactly whAt you did. 
WC - I thought it was 110re like a bowel movement. 
LAUGHTER • 
WC - We got the other end. 
WF - It was very, very impressive. 
WC - It was. I have a note here, Caldwell, that you turned around and con-
gratulated Tom after his statement. 
CB - I felt that all our weak hitters had come up before Toa, as riq wife 
told me later - that as far as the Republican party is concerned, 
we weren't loolri.ng so hot until RA.ilsback. 
WF - To11 was the first guy who had to cut the ~ard out of our entire 
group. You had pressure on you there. 
TR - SAndman was damn good in his forceful way, and here I was llllprepared! 
HF - To■, 7ou had giTen virtually the same talk to the 'iednesday group meeting 
that morning, and somebody in the audience suggested to you that 
your opening statement be just that. 
TR - But I wanted it typed. I didn't even have anything typed. 
WC - You wre pretty anxious oyer that. I think we got together shortly 
before, and the press was hounding us. We didn't want to go back to 
his roo■• We didn't haye time. 
TR - Yeah, we were meeting in our office. I didn't have time to do anything. 
CB - We were meeting in you office and somebody kept bringing you drafts of 
if and you finally started to walk around and worked on it a little bit. 
TM - We were at the table, and he'd get up and walk around and make some 
noise - I guess getting ready for his speech that night. The group 
met until 6:30 and we were scheduled to go on national TV at 7:30. 
we - And you[TR] were getting really anxious. 
TR - And then I heard Sanda.an. I did not mind any of the rest of them, 
but then Sandman - I could just see the ge~.IJ.~ans out there cheering. 
_!1!':fitc;q wa• a- lleP9hmeH~1!$;:»si:nt '.: ~ wail going to vote !or 
impeachment, but he didn't say that. _He 1dM-"t--EWft reau, hb,t. •hat 
.the--4---<>U21! I · Jir ane .---
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WC - I think it was ~alter who probabl.7 expressed the most reservation. 
CB - I think he [Nixon J was also endeavoring to mi.sue the CIA, when he was 
trying to get them to talk about Mexico or something. 
JM - That is really the main offence there. 
TM - Moving on to, F, "destroyi~ and concealing relevant material" - we 
were thinking about the lat minute gap but there was considerable dis-
cussion as to whether to put the word "destroy" in there. 
TR - Well, what they were doing again is using imputation rather than direct 
evidence of his involvement. There was no evidence that he did anything 
about the destroying, but. he certainly did conceal after knowing. 
CB - That was Peterson's stuff too, right? Withholding relevant material 
evidence. 
HF - Did a.n;ything ever colnl!9 of that very technical session we had about the 
tape and about Rosemary Wood.a and the opportunity to erase it and the 
confiict of testimoey as to whether it had been erased five times? 
Did she ever get into trouble? 
JM - I read last week she has an office across the street fro■ the White 
House and is sorting out. the Presidnent's papers. 
WF - Who all do you think really erased that tape? 
CB - Rose11Bl"1• 
. JR-::.~ :C:.think:::.R~ms.r,r=a-t::ttte~"iaent, ~uest-. 
RT - I think so, too. 
WF - I would rather bet that Nuon did it and she was helping him. 
CB - When wul.d you· say Nixon or Rosemary did it? 
WF - Down in Florida. 
RT - I think that the tape erasure was deliberate. 
TR - Yeah. 
CB - I would say the Sa.Ille, that Nixon hiieelf did it, if he had the mechaniaal 
knowledge. 
HF - That's the trouble, because the machine was so complicated. 
/ 
I 
Tape II, pl8 
WF - I bet he needed her help to run the machine. That is the on.!7 thing. 
He just decided that he couldn't trust an;ybody else to do it. Ya got 
to handle it 70ursel!! You know, that's what blew the tapes wide open 
because you got to the point where he couldn't get control o! the tapes 
hileel!, except this one time. Anywhere else he had to go thru s011ebod)' 
else to get the tapes. 
TR - That's right. 
TM - Looking at G, the cleaency charge. I think, Railsback, you were ■ost 
concerned about. that. 
~-,.._~4....--
TR - I di-dz'¢ IDAt the edited tr~cripts themselves dealth with cle11enc7, 
J ~ -5Rd they were so ubiguous and so subject to di!f erent interpre•ations, 
" that I was Tery bothered about charging hi■ with re~ offering 
clemeney. Al tho he hinted about. it, he discussed it, and •••• 
HF - I wasn't that concerned. 
RT - I was. I know you weren't; we discussed it. 
'WC - I included in rq stateaent about the code words that were used - you 
know they didn't .talk about "cleaenc7." 
WF - That becue sub-paragraph 9, didn't it? 
' 
JM - That was included in "faTOrable treatment and consideration." 
TR - I agree, I like tha:t,. 
R'1' - I expect we spent quite a bit or tim on that. 
HF - I wasn't bapP7 with the final. thing, we just weren't that sure. 
TR - That's what I aean. 
WF - I Toted to strike that when I made rq motion. 
TR - You did. lie were both concerned about it. 
HF - The eases we had were an exawple o! the other side when he [? J and 
the President and Ehrliehman in July were walking along the beach in 
California, and he said, •No, we can't offer clemency." 
TR - See, it was IIUddled up and it was Tery cloudy. There were some other 
instances where he appeared to be sanctioning it. 
~ 
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TR - Yes, it was a good, strong cal!le. 
WF - I thought we had hi.!11 by the yingya.ng there. 
TR - And you know from where? the edited transcripts! 
CB - Right. 
.T.R--..,....,Thw..;:ver.e-at.up~Dmlgh-t.o.d.eave-that-st:u,f-r- 1:ng.h~dited--tMBS~1)tS. 
~ ::- ·•---
WC - Do you recall Wiggins' arguments on this, though? That under existing 
law you could not support making false, misleading public statements 
that were impeachable unless you had a swearing on the Bible - that 
type of thing - and was before a magistrate. That is the only time 
a case had c011edown that you couldn't be accused of making a false state-
ment on the leTel of impeachable offenses unless he had actually taken 
an oath. [?] Do ;you reaall that? 
WF - I don't recall p87ing much attention to it, but I do recall the statement. 
But. this H is strictly the Peterson meeting where he'd called Ehriichllan 
and Haldeman in from the ante-room. Isn't that what we are talking about? 
TR - Yeah, but it was a series of meetings - at least two or three occasions 
he promised that he would presen-e the confidence. 
CB - "You can trust me, wait until I get Ehrlichman on the phone."' 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - Ehrlichman was standing right outside the door. 
TR - Henrr Peterson, when he testified, tried to helo in 1fff judgment to -_,, .,, 
kind of so(t,en it. 
WF - He did. When we pinned him dOWl'l on "would you distinguish betwean simply 
sharing that information and suggesting that they take a course of action, 
which is what he did. He told Haldeman, "You had better get together 
with John and map ;your strategy about the money"- that was blatant. 
And also Kalmbach. · 
HF - Tom [R] mentioned briefly that it was all in the edited transcripts, 
and this has alway-s amazed me. It t>ook a careful reading, you had to 
read the edited transcripts of March and April of '73 back and forth, 
because matter~ came up and IJ'l37be a month later they were discussed 
again, and ;you had a series of meetings. But nevertheless, there it 
was, and it was given us and everything I had to conclude was that they 
never expected us to read it carefully. 
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TM - Yes, those were concerns that we had wheter or not we were going to have 
to proTe all the allegation or if aIJ7 one of them stadning alone would be 
enough for impeachment. 
CB - I remember the discussion. We were very sure that if we failed to prove 
one of the charges, the article couldn't follcv. 
TR - That's right. 
WC - The other thing we were concerned about was the actual proof !or the 
Senate - that we had locked ourselves into the specific allegations, 
and your commant that you may- have 105% of the evidence but it may 
not all get in. That was the other concern, that much o! the evidence 
that we had was not admisable. 
TM - One point that we .finally looked at were the specific.:._ charges, on page 
7, point 8. That was pretty important. We kind of rubled across that 
under the pressure that the group had, and the speed'\dth which we were 
moving. We finally realized that was very, very important that we move 
to the disjunctive. There were no changes in draft 7 mrt.il ve get to 
page 3 of it, and then strike "and" and insert "or." 
%?-,?-
TR - ~, that was smart. 
TM - You know, we could have been nailed on that very easily. But we caught 
it. 
CB - Did the draft work on number 7 take place in Railsback's office? and 
also at the dinner at night? 
TM - Right - 7 and 8. We nU11bered them differently here, but frankly they 
were considered Wednesday afternoon and also Thursday evening. All day 
Thursday I belieTe you were in devate on TV and never got together until 
Thursday evening. That was the first time we went over to the Capitol 
Hill Club for dinner, and really I am not sure who exactly was there. 
RT - I know I wasn't, because I was going to have to make my- talk that night, 
and I was panicky, because it was the same situation that you [TR] had 
been in the previous night. 
HF - I was not there. 
'll'F - Read your notes, Caldwell - what do you have on Thursday? 
CB - All right. "We had dinner at the Capitol Hill Club. Hogan, Thornton, 
Frank Polk, RAilsback, Butler, Mann, and Mooney. Compil.eted draft of 
article one, pretty much like Donahue had submitted it. We changed 
burglary to illegal entry, al tho this is probabl7 what the7 were con- · 
victed of, we struck out 'up to the preseent time,' with Thornton -
I guess he wasn't there. We inserted 'one or more.' We had some kind 
of hangup on the Ellsberg question but finally decided to le.ave Ells-
berg out of it, and finally we had some on number nine, that the per jury 
one. We added that language, 'or rewarding individuals. '" 
~ - May I interrupt about Ellsberg? I think our concerns about him were 
two-fold: one, the national securit7 problem, and two, the fact that 
he was an SOB for doing what he did in the first place, and some of us 
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TR - Now you are talking about knowledge, that's different. I! he knew about 
it, then, as far as I am concerned, he had a duty •••• I think what we 
did was just the opposite. When you are talking about a President, when 
you are talking about impeaching somebody, throwing him out, instead or 
being reelected, I don't think that you can hold a guy resposible who 
did not have any knowledge, did not condone. [?] 
HF - But it's still obstruction of justice. 
TR - Now wait a minute. There is a distinction where he has knowledge, or 
condones or approves. 
WF - I think we put an affirmative dut7 on him "to take care." If a gey is 
going to hold him.self out and be President of the United States, he has 
got some obligations, some affirms.ti ve obligations. 
CB - You [TR] didn't state it that stnmgl.y. 
TR - I guess I didn't. 
RT - I think it is interesting that here there is a now, just looking back 
thru the drafts. the words "course of conduct" that are used thru 
draft 5, and with draft 6, the word is "policy." 
TR - That• s Doar. We vouldn' t accept that. 
RI' - But the interesting thing is that since the Railsback amendment was in-
troduced, it did contain a "plan" in the disjuctive. 
TR - That "plan" was throwing out a bone, to be quite honest, as far as I was 
concerned. I didn't even want "plan" in there. 'We agreed with "plan" 
in the disjunctive "or plan.• It was strictly throwing them a bone. 
RT - Their position was that it would be important to be able to prove bad, 
malicious motive - a malum - on the pa.rt of the President, and that 
there had to be more than just a course of action theory. That had to 
be premeditation. That is what they wanted and that is why "plan" more 
satisfied their position and yet did not offend your position. 
TR - Yeah, with the disjunctive. 
WC - As I recall, when you introduced that and Wiggins and Dennis jumped on 
it, you actually yielded to me to explain how come you used the word 
"plan." As I recall I tried to bail you out on that and said, "You 
used the word 'plan' beea'W!e that is the word the President used in 
the edited transcripts." 
TR - Sure, -a-very', very~ jab. c;f Jost re~l!&S::::::saiekt. You did a 
good job tying that language into the edited transcripts. 
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WC - And he said, "I!' yuu say that, Bill, if' you take that action, then this 
will a110unt to a coverup of a coverup." And I said, "Peter, if you say 
that publicall7, it is all over for this whole procedure." And he went 
back to his office, and I don't know who he talked to at that point, 
but St .Clair was. thereafter allowed. 
W'F - That is exactl7 what I mean by s011e of his doings were really a reaction 
from your pressure, like our pressure on the witnesses: we're going to 
stick with four witnesses, and by God, nothing e1.se. That was it. I 
called him, "To hell with that!" I was going to scream to high heaven 
about it. 
TR - That's right, and I vent up to a press conference with McClory. It was 
a very placid, tranquil conferencec ~ Peter called on me and I just 
raised hell. He ~as go~~let1~ill four wit~~~s. ~ ,. . 
jumped all onr him. ~ ~ one-man subpoena~ It was 1.ai! o'ur a--.. 
~P :J]I !ijf aiid tbe#iki :i$03:i½1:QM - that was another one. , v/;Jj_J.,v ~ 
V l'vJ'.V-.,'j;, ef ~ ✓I 
WC - Not calling Colson. 1 ,._ ~ t; i ·/ 1-...u .,,.__ c,., 
6' . /" 
WF - Not calling Colson - that got to be the issue. I just 
a minute ago that Alexander Butterfield was a CIA plant 
House. 
HF - Could not have been a better located fellow. 
LAUGHI'ER. 
heard on the radio ............,, , 
in the lhite ~~~ 
WF - I never got to where I really understood, though, what was his moti-
vation was, beeawse he had stooled - there is no question about it -
he stooled on 'em. I am not saying that he didn't tell the truth, 
but he's a stoolie. 
CB - I don't think that's fair. I think the guy was a messenger boy and he 
answered every question they asked him and didn't volunteer anything. 
JM - Let me get something o!'!' rq chest, because frankly I think the partisan-
ship issue is of importance historically here. 
TR - Yeah, I do too. 
JM - Before getting back to it, which I will do very quick!y, I want to say 
this about rq dealings with Rodino. Rodino was iln'olved d~ last 
two or three weeks with me in one private conversation, that was on a 
Sunday morning. McClory, Rodino, Doar, Frank Polle, and y-ou, Tom? 
TM - No, I wasn't there. 
JM - ·OK, you weren't there. We tried to kick ott the final polishing o!' 
article II. 
.. 
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WF - You didn't havea vote on St.Clair's participation. 
TR - Yeah, I know this. 
WF - We were with you all the we:r. 
TR - I know you were. We had plenty debate about it, and I had disc~sions 
with Peter Rodino. 
WC - The questions of whether he could also go the depositions •••• 
TR - That is another one. 
CB - They abandoned depositions, so that wouldn't be •••• 
TR - Probably one cf the biggest.akes was his adamant position on calling 
four witnesses, instead of 1 -~t.Clair leew&7. I voter.. with J;r:»1, -at.,,, St,.._ql.!!r was, in rq opinion, just completely reasonable on everything 
he-"liiiid71ie didn't want much time, he took two hours when they to_ok, · 
hell, I d~~~~~h.9~~presenting their thing. St.Clair was, 
I thought, ~;~-~hen w~ did .finally get his right to call wit-
nesses, he called eight or something like that. We will go back and there 
were lllaDY', 1181V points. I'll tell you, Peter Rodino, to his credit, 
and all of you guJS, and Walter almost always, and the sensible Democrats 
backed off on procedural questions. 
WC - It's true. 
WF - That is why it was so dumb to get. wrapped up in them. 
TR - You were smart enough to see when it was gonna be a real dispute. It 
could haTe been a party thing. 
RT - Quite the contrary. 
WF - That's the worst thing in the world for sy political position, and I 
knuw for~ and Jim too. 
JM - The more strongly partisan 7ou were the le!!s ;you wanted it to appear so. 
TR - Yeah. The rightJ~~ ~r_oss-exaaine was another one. I got into it with ~ 
Kastenmeier tdH\iiir"'lie meant • ;s.k w}:\e&-!!. -9:uestioned the right to M1eR 
examine [?]. I argued that we ~eeause~daslced Jenner, "Does that 
statement have aeything in there that prevents a person fr011 cross-
examining?" He said, "Of cour!le not." 
WF - You all think that our staff did what they should have in the way of 
investigation? 
TR - Not at all. 
CB - They didn't have enough manpower. 
LAUGHTER. 
•• 
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WF - We gould've gotten bogged down and fighting over Jaworski and it would 
have taken the ste811 out of the impeachment inquiry about the same time, 
because this was the !all of '73. 
HF - On these procedural issues, and even the more substantive issues, for 
example in tl7ing to respond to the edited White House transcripts and 
so forth, it was the Republicans who were meeting periodically, almost 
weekly, and except for the four of us, I think it should be noted, the 
pressure, the intensity of feeling, on the part of every other Republican 
there, including those like Hogan and Froelich, vas very intense to the 
point when you just don't want to participate in the discussion, but I 
remember Bill and I as late as May- 1st felt so. 
JM - Correct me if I'm wrong, but we didn't have caucuses on these pro-
cedural issues. 
RT - That's correct. 
JM - They were spontaneous.· on our part. The only one was the time we re-
cessed, as I've said. 
TR - No, I'll bet you on that. 
JM - All right. 
CB - But Jim, you don't need to have a caucus when your invading army is 
overruning the continent. Everybody know~ you are going to follow it. 
To say it wasn't part of the motivation I'd have to doubt. 
JM - No, that's not true. l'• saying that I don't think that Walter and Ray-
and I were partisan motivated on the procedural votes. 
TR - No, I am not saying that. 
JM - I would bet I could take and win, before an impartial jury, on the issue 
of the subpoena power. 
TR - I don't know. 
JM - I do. 
CB - What the question there was, do you want to give the minoritY' the 
right, Ed Hutchinson, to subpoena anybody he wanted to, unlill:ited. It 
might make a good trial out 0£ the power of investisation. That was the 
alternative. 
WC - No, it wasn't. 
TR - No. The majority overruled. 
JM - What difference does that make - or the entire committee doing the 
subpoening, what's the difference? 
r <;;-,,} "--
TR - We will have Mooney go over these procedural points and list them and L\l _ ,r~ 
I'll tell you, it wasn't all the Republicans who were wrong. I tJrlQ(IRht CA.o 
we were wrong on open meetings. Weren't we for opening it all up? 
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WC - Yes, but for a different. ; ason. 
--1. ~- I> '-v- ~ 
TR - We were demogogues. I was llrong 
only one who suppoijted that. 
;;._0J-·· 
in the letter[?]. You [CB] were the 
CB - Don't get into that. That was the dumbest thing I ever heard of; who 
ever heard of writing a letter to a judge? You ain't doing right. 
TR - No, no, then we wrote a letter to Nixon. 
CB - I know. Who ever heard of a court writing a letter to a litigant. There 
ain't no such animaJ. Who ever heard of it? 
TR - lfaTI, I will tell you the reason: we wanted to bend OTer baclcvards to be 
fair. 
CB - No, the reason was we did not han enough evidence to charge him with an;r 
official failure to measure up to our requirements, so had to do it 
in£ormlly. 
TR - Oh, no. 
JM - I had one basic hangup about. the matter. I was looking for an objecti Te _' 
investigation, and you were all looking for a trial, that was the diffenmee. 
TR - No. 
WF - . What could have done and might have done at tne point when we wrote the 
letter is cite for contempt. 
CB - Yeah, you do or you don't. 
WF - But it would never have had to come to that. 
TR - Conyers wanted to do that. 
JM - It would have had the effect of straightening out. the problem with the 
executive branch as it was then. And it would haTe been on the basis of 
the !acts as opposed to some proce.dural basis like the contempt of Congress. 
TR - But, Jim, you do not start out tlJ;l~ _~-,..__It is not whether Hutchinson has 
the power, it is whether Rodino iliiwiiave it unilaterall.7. 
HF - Solely. 
TR - Sure, you' re trying to convince the American public this gu:r should be 
given a . legitimate, fair inquiey. So you give a Democratic chairman 
who's met with Albert and Tip O'Neil, the power to start an impeachment 
inquiry-. And 7.ou J)#I' b abolish the notice requirement r or holding 
meetings. That"i!, le terrible. 
I 
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WC - Yes, but for a different x eason. 
.---". (\ - ' ,.,_;7J_1 ,·r- ~ 
TR - We were demogogues. I was wrong 
only one who suppoijted that. 
in the letter[?]. You [CB] were the 
CB - Don't get into that. That was the dumbest thing I ever heard of; who 
ever heard of writing a letter to a judge? You ain't doing right. 
TR - No, no, then we wrote a letter to Nixon. 
CB - I know. Who ever heard of a court writing a letter to a litigant. There 
ain't no such animal. Who ever heard or it? 
TR - Wall, I will tell you the reason: we wanted to bend over backwards to be 
fair. 
CB - No, the reason was we did not ha...e enough evidence to charge him with a:rrr 
official failure to measure up to our requirements, so had to do it 
informally. 
TR - Oh, no. 
JM - I had one basic hangup about the matter. I was looking for an objectiTe · 
investigation, and you were all looking for a trial, that was the difference. 
TR - No. 
WF - . What could haYe done and might have done at tee point when we wrote the 
letter is cite for contempt. 
CB - Yeah, 7ou do or you don't. 
WF - But it would never have had to come to that. 
TR - Coeyers wanted to do that. 
JM - It would have had the effect of straightening out the problem with the 
executive branch as it was then. And it would haTe been on the basis of 
the facts as opposed to some procedural basis like the contempt of Congress. 
TR - But, Jim, you do not start out t~! -~ 1 ,,._ It is not whether Htztchinson has 
the power, it is whether Rodino iiew~ve it unilaterally. 
HF - Solely. 
TR - Sure, you're trying to convince the American public this guy should be 
given a . legitimate, fair inqu:i.cy. So you give a Democratic chairman 
who's met with Albert and Tip O'Neil, the power to start an impeachment 
inquiry. And ,:ou -4;;11 1 b abolish the notice requirement !or holding 
meetings. That'"fM lie terrible. 
I 
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HF - We might just contemplate what difference it is now from a ye.a:r ago: 
two to one plus one - there is a lot of difference between that and 
21 to 17. 
I JM - There sure is. 
~ J _, "' _.') ) \ , ·- :- . 
TR - Peter was trying to control the -e.rad:ee. 
CB - I don't think the matter would have been referred to the pre~nt com-
mittee, do you? 
HF - It might have been. But the Republicans would not have been shown all 
these considerations. 
CB - Well, I !eel that now it is not that representative of enn the whole body. 
SL - What i! Cellar had still been chairman? 
WF -
WC - What if Jack Brooks had been cha.iraan? /If Cellar had been chairman, it 
don't think he would have brought it along. He would haTe stifled it 
somehow or another. I don't think he ever thought that Nixon should have 
been illpe.ached. What do ;you all think? 
_ J JJ' ..ld 
TR - I just saw hiJII the other night. 
LAUGHTER. 
WC - A Railsback rellark. 
He is looking ~ Good guy. 
rs - On that · autobiographical remark [TR - That was great, thank 7ou. J, I 
would like to make one more comment. Do you recall that in n:>st of 
your interviews, I told that little analogy of Lincoln sqing that 
if you want to stop religion or a church - well, this is the time to 
give the credit to the real author, Ray Thornton. Tell 'em right. 
APPLAUSE. 
RT - If you want to stop the construction of a church, don't start an argument 
with the religion, but over the location o! the building. 
00 - We shoved that again tonight. Shall we adjourn? You know the agenda for 
tomorrow. 
END OF TAPE IV AND OF SE.5SION II. 
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JM - That's why' I f:Lnally gave in frankly, because I knew that even tho you all 
were going to vote on the article, you were unha.ppy. 
RT - The indication was that you would vote for art.iclce II whether or not that 
addition was included. 
TR - Exactly. I could have supported it, with it or not. 
JM - Your position on that final.17 camsed 11e to make a separate article. 
WC - It really belonged as part. or I rather than or II. 
RT - You're correct - the obstruction or justice. But the discussion was 
whether to add it to article II. 
TR - That's right. But I think that at one point, we did discuss making it 
part o! the Watergate coverup. 
WC - That's right. When it came up for debate during McClory's article III, 
I believe, Ray-, 7ou said something and I said something at that tizne that 
we were supporting an amendment on the noor or something to that effect 
- to have it included in article I or ·II, and not as a separate article. 
RT - That's right, but I would have still supported it as a separate article. 
WC - That's right, 7ou did say that during the debate. 
TR - I just felt that we had not exhuasted our proper remedies . to enforce the 
power that we had, there were also other measures. 
HF - Do you still feel that way? 
TR - Yes, I do. 
[? ]- I am not sure that I do a.n.ylK)re. 
[Mr. Mann takes telephone call]. 
TR - For the record, let me just state that I felt there were certain customary, 
traditional procedures that the House had available to it to enforce sub-
poenas, ant_t.1~0 enf'orce compliance with subpoenas, and they involved 
letting a -IBf'COme before the House with an attorney to confront the body. 
CB - iihat you call due process. 
TR - ~ due process. And the other part of it was executive pritllege. 
I thought that we had a right probably to go into court and I thought 
that it would have sustained the House in its attempt to get that material 
against the argument of executi..-e privilege, but I thought the Presidnet 
had a right to assert that. 
WF - iiiell, I didn't support anything to do with it, but I initially felt that 
we did not eleTate it to that status because we should have even cited 
him for contempt for failure to comply- or we should have gone to the 
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TR - Ray, if you'll yield. I want to congratulate and compliment 1our state-
ment, which I thought was excellent, and this is very, very uiportant, I 
think, in our meeting this morning. I don't agree with you, but I thought 
your statement was just excellent. As far as going to court, I was voted 
down, you know; I think we got six votes to go to court. 
RT - Reasonable men can disagree. 
TR - But I just wanted to add a postscript: that Alex Bickel, it'ho I think knows 
more about it than Bill Cohen - he was a hell of a great constiuutional 
expert -
CB - I hope so. 
WC - He does. 
TR - about ten days after that vote was taken, came out with an article that 
said that we should have gone to court. Very strongly arguing from a 
constitutional standpoint and then shortly thereafter he died. But there 
was a very important part of the precedent-setting •••• 
WC - Being punished, probably. 
CB - The whole question that you are directing us to is really that we didn't 
just go far enough down the road. 
TR - No, two things, altho that was part of it. We didn't exhuast. our tradi-
tional remedies. In not exhausting them, we in effect, took away some- of 
the rig*-s of ,our due process that I think are guaranteed to other ,u)Sble 
perSO?JS ~ "6e""'hei cf--4Ili' conte~~ .!kB,- other words t witnesses• We didn't pr~ 
tect ~-cy 3-seei.ng that ~ -nad the traditional rights. And the 
second part is executive privilege. All during these procedings, the 
Presidnet was arguing executive privilege. That is where you get into 
the court tests. Is it proper to test that argument by going to court? 
I think we would have won and settled it. I think the Supreme Court 
would have held that we did have a right, and executive pritllege would 
give way in that case. We did not see fit to do so. 
CB - And summarily so. 
WC - I think your position was best expressed on page 16 in the report where 
it reads, "Before the President's refusal to comply with collllittee sub-
peonas can be raised to the level of an impeach.able offense, the com-
mittee at a minimum should wait until the House of Representatives has 
found that non-compliance tobe wilt'ul, contemptuous, and illegitimate. 
Since the committee did not pursue this course of action, it should not 
now seek to raise non-compliance to the level of a separate and independent 
act." 
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TR - Who is going to decide that? 
RT - The Congress. 
HF - The House. 
TR - Who normally interprets the Constitution? 
RT - The court does, but the court doesn't in cases of impeachment, because 
impeachment may include the court itself. What if you are impeaching the 
Chief Justice of the United States, instaed of the ~sident? Would you 
refer the exercise of the power of subpoena to this court? to the White 
House? 
VF - To the executive branch? I agree with Ray there. 
CB - Even in this instance we hadn't gone that far. We hadn't gor..e to all 
the processes. 
RT - That is literally- the legal argument: whether ve had exhausted all the 
processes. 
TR - We had not, clearly. 
CB - That's right. 
WC - Doesn't the person, before he can be cited for contempt, have an opportunity 
to go before the House? 
TR - Yes, to make a statement. 
HF - The time, you remember, when we talked about contempt, we figured it would 
delay proceedings a year, a year and a helf. 
TR - All the safeguards normally accorded to a criminal defendant do the same 
thing. 
HF - But as a practical matter, we were reluctant to put it off. 
TR - As a practical matter, we should knock our:,ltves out t~ assur~ that he is 
given all, i! not more, of the safeguards :81Jie ordimry witness who 
has to appear I e_..,l!S. The important thing to remember is this was a 
separate article and must stand on its own feet. Forget the Watergate 
coverup, forget the abuse of power of the sensitive agenci~s. Are you 
going to impeach a ~"wnen he asserts executive privilege and fails to 
produce? Here he is asserting executive privilege, he fails to produce, 
so instead of going thru your traditional contempt processes, you impeach 
him. That would never stand up. 
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RT - You know that we didn't go into this depth at the tille we were doing the 
drafting. 
WC - No, we sure didn't. 
RT - It might be that ve are overdoing it now, but I do think that the court 
decisions themselTes have indicated that they should not be involved in 
the determinations which by nature are political or assigned to another 
department or goverrmient, and clearly the impeachment process is assigned 
to the Congress. Baker vs. Carr, and the other cases seem to support 
that, but whether t~y did or not, I still go back to the very practical 
point, that impeachment cuts across the departments of government·. It 
addresses both the executive branch or government and the judicial ·branch. 
Most impeachments have occurred in the judicial branch, and if you are 
going to relate questions back to the judiciary when you are dealing 
with a process which goes to the judiciar;r itself, that logically just 
doesn't follow. 
DS - May I interrupt just a 110ment? Ray- just said, "We did not go into this 
depth at the time." This is a sign:ilicant thing. Do you all agree that 
this is hindsight now? 
WF - Yeah. 
DS - In other words, 7ou didn't do this kind of thing a 7ea:r ago? 
HF - Not this way. Ve expressed how we f'elt at that time, but we didn't as 
a group discsus at this depth wirether or not •••• 
TR - No, but we were dealing with it, and Cohen had a statement and I had a 
statement, I argued it. I think everybody was involved. 
CB - WE had a substantial discussion or it when article III ea.me before the 
committee. But as far as our drafting problem, as I remember, we really 
weren't concerned whether we were going to slip it into article II or 
not. We had been resolving it on a whole less esoteric level than that. 
~twas 
TR - No,/my argument and Bill's argument against a.rtiele III. But I think 
this diseussion today is perhaps the most important as far as the future,. 
~ other words, it gives an inkling to acy- future Ho~e members who might 
have an impeachment problem, how to go about it. 
WF - I think that is the value or Article III having been voted on. It is im-
portant for the futrue, and that is the rationale of m:y basic turnabout 
on it, is that in retrospect I think to maintain the viability of a 
potential investigation lll'lder circumstances where you did not have the 
aid and eomf ort that we did - you know, hell, we had 1110re help than yau 
can possibly imagine thru other fortuitous circumstances. 
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HF - Why was it that Sarbanes and Hungate 'ltere chosen, and that you yourself 
weren't interested in presenting the substitute? 
TR - Yes, that's agood question. 
WF - He's smart, but he ain't dumb. 
LAUGHTER. 
JM - I think that says it as well as anything. In the .first place, politicall7, 
I did not want to be out front. I think that is the most obvious answer . 
I can give. Secondly, I knew that these were both people of ability and 
moderation anp. the image would be just the right one to present. 
WF - That's the war I view it too. 
JM - That's the only real answer. 
CB - I think it was a pretty good choice, all things considered. It would have 
been hard for Kastenmeier or Edwards to put that over with the same con-
viction that Hungate did, the same standard. 
WF - It would have been hard .for yuu all to go along with it. 
CB - Yeah, that's what I meant. 
WC - Let me say this about Hungate: rq opinion· changed. I wasn't terribly-
impreseed with his opening statement because it was too light, flippant 
for the gravity of the proceedings. 
TR - Yeah, sure. 
WC - And so he would not have been m:J' choice because of his Missouri humor, 
his Mark Twain quotes, and so :forth. I would not have picked him, 
but I would have picked Sarbanes as opposed to Hungate, but then during 
the course of the debate, my opi..."lion changed on Hungate, because he did 
a serious and good job. 
CB - I have a note that Bob McClory came over to me and asked me if I would 
be interested in introducing one of those things. I can't figure out 
which one it was, but you know I thought it was a little bit preSUllptuous 
and I didn't give that a whole lot of thought. 
LAUGHTER. 
CB - But where in the world did he get that from? 
~ ~c__ ~ 
TR - The?'e ia one ~heF tiling eeeri M•Qi;c,ry. I had heard that • ~as reall7 
going t~
1
~3fof:, strong against. article I. So I called him and in effect 
said, " , If you come out too strong against article I, I think we 
are going to make a monkey out or you. Here is what we have." And I 
listed the chain of events where ve could prove that the President had 
not told the truth~ 4-.. Iv~ ~ • 
WF - He~ s got to be schizophrenic to come out strong against article I and 
support article II. You got to be kidding. 
LAUGHTER. 
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D.5 - I think there is a kind of consensus among you that you might want to 




to the pragmatic question that we ought to ask each other: where do we go 
from here? Because this may be the last meeting of your historic group, 
and I think we ought to consider a few points and options. I'll begin 
by giving the two obvious options. One, that it be totally record, that 
it be transcribed, locked up, period. That is really the way I began. 
Or second, that in some fashion or other, you think of publishing. Then 
of course are the further subquestions of who, format, and so forth. 
Now let me assure all of you, as I have told a couple of you individually, 
and I very much mean it, that Tom ar.d Steve and I have no axes to grind. 
We have nothing to sell you. So I am going to leave it open purposely, 
to use the inductive method, and what comes out . of this, comes out. Now 
I know, Tom, you have something to say. 
Well, it seems to me that a proper thing to do would be consider having 
a book. And if we do that, I can see us having an introduction, having 
a chapter on each of us, uing our first interview, really leading up 
to where we came together, and then having some : ·· . of the book dedicated 
to where aaj::a;IJtr we came together. What do you do? ,iho writes it? 
Do we writeit ,or do we get a professional? I had a chance, for instance, 
to talk to Tony Lucas, who is a ~ friend ~; and who interviewed 
me and Ham about impeachment, and who covered impeachment~  
PulM!l&P ~e;y_~for the New York Times, and very, very well known 
and higlily regarded. He expressed a real interest in help:iF,g~J!S for a 
piece of the action. I just happened to see Mike Waldman,_~ '°ire"wsday 
, and I just mentioned to him that we were meeting, and he was very 
interested. In other •ords, r=thl::nk that W:lis t,h; :a 
~r±i c ;:Rd ~&w · · e 
Whether it would ever sell is another thing. Father, I would be 
happy if you would be interested in doil1g ~·t But tne night before we 
~~II'-~. ~ AA f, ~ came down here I called an agent) who 1.s "'l.~ c arge ~ Woodward and Bern-
stein and many other people Lwh~ wePe S1F92kjpg. I happend to have him 
too, before I lost rey damn voice. But a very savvy guy who mentioned to 
me one time that he is a friend of Dave Obst, the guy that negotiated for 
Woodward and Bernstein, and advanced and put it together. I told him who 
I was meeting with, and who they guys are, and he was very interested. 
But this guy said that he would call Obst and just discuss it with him and 
personally I think that we ought to at least consider carefully inquiring 
into all the potential alternatives, and even talking to some people about 
the possibilities. In other words, I don't have anything concrete, but 
a lot o expressions of interest. 
CS - I don't understand - are you all going to pull all this together in 
some kind of sequence? 
IlS- Yes, I should have included that in rcy- opening remarks. I would like 
all of you to correct the transcripts we gave you of your individual 
interviews, and givd them back to us, so that they say what you meant. 
Then you will get, I hope in relatively short order, transcripts of 
these few days, and again I hope all of you will do the same thing and 
go thru them and return them to us - to Tom Mooney's office. 
